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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH R. APP. P. Rule A(a) 
Appellate jurisdiction to decide the above-captioned matter 
is granted to the Utah Court of Appeals under authority of U.C.A. 
78-2-2(4) (ch. 1953, as amended). Petitioner/Appellant was charged 
by the state of Utah in the First Judicial District Court, Box 
Elder County with murder in the second degree, a felony of the 
first degree, and a jury verdict of guilty was pronounced on 
February 20, 1990. A timely notice of appeal was filed in the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah R. App. P. Rule 3 f'Appeal As of 
Right: How Taken". The Utah Supreme Court pursuant to U.C.A. 
78-2-2(3)(i) has appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the 
District Court involving a conviction of a first degree felony and 
under authority of subsection (4) the Supreme Court has the 
discretionary power to transfer to the Utah Court of Appeals any 
of the matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction. In this matter the Supreme Court exercised it power 
to transfer the above-captioned to the Utah Court of Appeals thus 
granting to the Court jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW FOR EACH ISSUE Wttft SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
UTAH R, APP. P. RULE 24(a)(5) 
1. Did the following acts of the Box Elder County Attorney 
constitute reversible error either through improper statements 
made individually or cummulatively, and did the trial court commit 
reversible error by denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial 
based upon the acts set forth in subparagraphs a. and b. below: 
a. by stigmitizing the Appellant as a "criminal11? 
b. by twice asserting, without supporting evidence, in 
the closing argument that Appellant and Co-Defenant Ray 
Cabututan conspired to fabricate their accounts of the events 
that occurred on October 25, 1989. 
c. repeatedly expressing his opinion that the 
Appellant and Co-Defendant Ray Cabututan were "liars", 
"lying", or "not telling the truth" in closing argument? 
d. twice referencing Co-Defendant Ray Cabututan1s 
conviction for the same offense charged against Appellant? 
e. twice commenting upon the strength of the evidence 
as compared to that presented in other murder cases? 
f. misstating, in closing argument, the testimony of 
the State's eyewitnesses regarding the crucial issue of 
Appellant's level of intoxication? 
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g. disparaging the legitimate defense strategy of 
admitting a lesser degree of guilt and seeking acquittal of 
the higher degree by stating, "Obviously, this defendant 
would love to be convicted of something less than second 
degree murder? 
h. stating, "I would submit to you that if [Appellant] 
was trying to help [the victim], it was just to help him out 
of this life and nothing else[,]ff and "[the Appellant is] out 
there just having a good old time beating [the victim]11. 
i. vouching for the credibility of Richard Anderson, 
the State of Utah's key eyewitness? 
The standard of review in regard to improper prosecutorial 
statements is whether the prosecutor's remarks brought to the 
attention of the jurors matters that they would not be justified 
in considering in reaching their verdict, and, if so, whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the misconduct so prejudiced 
the jury that there would have been a more favorable result absent 
the misconduct. State v Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (UT 1988). 
Rulings on whether the conduct of the prosecution warranted a 
mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 190 However, the error alleged in subparagraph (f) above 
can be held harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v 
Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1124 (UT 1982); State v Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 121 n.8 (UT 1989). 
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To the extent that any of these errors, specifically those 
alleged in subparagraphs c.,d.,e.,f.,g.,h., and i. above, were not 
brought to the attention of the trial court, this Court may 
nevertheless take notice of the error if it is a plain error 
affecting a substantial right of the defendant. Utah R. Evid. 
103(d). Lastly, cumulative error exists if the cumulative impact 
of substantial errors prejudiced Appellant's right to a fair 
trial. See State v Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (UT 1986). 
2. Was Appellant denied his United States Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right and State of Utah 
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, a 
fair trial, due process, and equal protection as a result of the 
following acts of the trial court: 
a, initially refusing to appoint, and then belatedly 
appointing a private investigator to assist Appellant's trial 
counsel in pretrial investigation and preparation? 
b. denying Appellant's Motion To Appoint Psychological 
and Expert Personnel and Motion To Allow Psychological 
Testing and Mental Evaluation for the purpose of establishing 
by expert testimony that the Appellant could not and did not 
form the intent to commit second degree murder due to 
voluntary intoxication? 
3. Did the trial court violate Appellant's United States 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right to effective 
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assistance of counsel, or otherwise commit reversible error by 
denying Appellant's Motion For Continuance of the trial date set? 
The standard of review is, in part, strictly a matter of 
constitutional law and judicial administration, see Hintz v Beto, 
379 F.2d 937, 942 (5th Cir. 1967), and, in part, whether the trial 
court clearly abused its discretion. State v Creviston, 646 P.2d 
750, 752 (UT 1982). 
4. Did Appellant's trial counsel fail to provide Appellant 
with effective assistance of counsel as required by the United 
States Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution by 
virtue of one or more of the following acts and omissions: 
a. by failing to timely file Appellant's Motion To 
Appoint Psychiatrist and Expert Personnel and Motion To Allow 
Psychological Testing and Mental Evaluation? 
b. failing to adequately investigate and prepare the 
case for trial? 
c. failing to call character witnesses on the 
Appellant's behalf? 
d. failing to object to many prejudicial and improper 
statements made by the prosecuting attorney during closing 
arguments?. 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
Appellant must show, (1) that Appellant's trial counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that a 
reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective 
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assistance of counsel, the result would have been different. 
State v Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (UT 1985). In other words, was 
the Appellant prejudiced by his counsels performance to such an 
extent that the trial cannot be relied upon as producing a just 
result? 
5. Did the trial court commit reversible error in referring 
to instructions already given to the jury in response to three 
separate jury requests for supplemental instructions relating to 
the issue of intent? The standard of review is whether the trial 
court's actions plainly resulted in a miscarriage of justice? 
State v Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 93 N.5 (UT 1981). 
6. Did the trial court commit reversible error in allowing 
the jury to deliberate for eight and one-half hours until 1:20 
a.m. after a fourth full day of trial? The standard of review is 
whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v Lactad, 761 
P.2d 23 (Utah Ap. 1988). 
7. Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing 
to allow the jury to view the scene of the crime? The standard of 
review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v 
Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P.2d 741 (UT 1945). 
8. Was there cumulative error made in this case, sufficient 
to warrant a reversal of Appellant's conviction? Cumulative error 
exists if the cumulative impact of substantial errors prejudiced 
Appellant's right to a fair trial. See State v Rammel, 721 P.2d 
498, 501-02 (UT 1986). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
IS DETERMINATIVE - UTAH ft. APP. P. RULE 24(aTTF7 
The interpretation of the following constitutional 
provisions, statutes and rules is determinative of the issues 
stated: 
Issue 1: Utah R. Criminal Procedure Rule 30 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
Issue 2: Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 




Issue 3: Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
Issue 4: Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
U.C.A. 77-14-3 
Issue 5: No constitutional provision or statute is 
determinative as to the issue presented 
Issue 6: Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
Issue 7: Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
Utah R. Criminal Procedure Rule 30 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE - UTAH R. APP. P. RULE 24(a)(7) 
The Criminal Information filed against Appellant in the First 
Circuit Court of Box Elder County, Utah, charged Appellant and 
three co-defendants, Don Brown, Ray Cabututan, and Billy Cayer, 
with committing the crime of Murder In The Second Degree , A Felony 
Of The First Degree, on the night of October 25, 1989, in 
violation of U.C.A. 76-5-203 (1953 as amended). The defendant's 
allegedly, jointly and in concert, caused the death of Miguel 
(Mike) Ramirez resulting from numerous blows from the defendant's 
feet, hands, and a wrench, wielded solely by Ray Cabututan, during 
a fight that occurred both inside and outside of the trailer 
houses where the defendant's were employed,, All of the 
defendants, as well as the State's three eyewitnesses to the 
alleged crime, Pichard Anderson, Eric Tilley, and Eddie Apadaca, 
resided in a small trailer camp resting on a remote piece of land 
located on the Northwest shore of the Great: Salt Lake and owned by 
Western Brine Shrimp Company, which employed all of the 
defendant's and eyewitnesses. 
The evidence is undisputed that the night of October 25, 1989 
was dark, cloudy, and a moonless night; the only outside lighting 
for tens of miles around the camp was a dim light emanating 
through the door of one or two of the trailers. Due to the dim 
lighting, only one of the State's three eyewitnesses, Richard 
Anderson, was able to positively identify the Appellant as being 
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amoung the three or four people, other than the victim, that 
participated in the latter part of the fight that occurred outside 
the trailers, when the fight escalated and weapons were used. 
Appellant properly raised the following defenses, including 
voluntary intoxication as precluding him from forming the 
requisite intent for second degree murder; self-defense because 
the victim wielded a knife, and non-participation in the major 
part of the fight that occurred outside the trailers, when weapons 
were used upon the victim. After a separate jury trial lasting 
four days, the Appellant was found guilty of second degree murder 
and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years to life. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR RFVIEW 
UTAH R. APP. P. RULE 24(a)(77 
According to the testimony of Eddie Apadaca, one of the 
State's three eyewitnesses, that on the evening of October 25, 
1989, the Appellant, along with eight other employees of Western 
Brine Shrimp Company, were present and residing in three trailer 
houses located on the company's property on the northwest side of 
the Great Salt Lake. Of the nine crew members, Richard Anderson 
and Eric Tilley, the State's other eyewitnesses, and Sherman 
Gallardo resided in trailer #1. Eddie Apadaca, Ray Cabututan, and 
Miguel (Mike) Ramirez, the victim, resided in trailer #2. 
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Billy Cayer, Don Brown, and the Appellant resided in trailer #3. 
Trial transcript (hereinafter "T". at 84-87). At approximately 
9:45 p.m., the Appellant went to trailer #2 and asked Eddie 
Apadaca to come over to trailer #3. When Eddie Apadaca entered 
trailed #3, the residents of trailer #3 as well as Ray Cabututan, 
Eddie Apadacafs roommate, were drinking whiskey and vodka. The 
Appellant, in a friendly manner, offered Eddie Apadaca a drink. 
Don Brown accused Eddie Apadaca of acting like he was the foreman 
of the crew. Ray Catubutan also expressed his displeasure with 
Eddie Apadaca for failing to help Ray Catvibutan with some work and 
in a drunken state started hitting Apadaca and dazed him with a 
blow to his head with a sharpening stone, making things pretty 
blurry. (T.87-91, 104-106). 
Eddie Apadaca then ran back to his trailer #2. At this point 
in time, Eddie Apadaca's story begins to differ materially from 
the Appellant's testimony, which is set forth below. Shortly 
thereafter, defendant's Don Brown, Ray Cabututan, Billy Cayer, and 
Appellant all entered trailer #2 at approximately the same time. 
Ray Cabututan was seen holding nunchunks. Mike Ramirez jumped 
between Eddie Apadaca and the four men. The Appellant stated they 
should get the knife in Mike Ramirez's pocket. Then, both Mike 
Ramirez and Don Brown pulled out knifes. After Mike Ramirez 
dropped his knife, Don Brown folded and put away his knife, then 
Don Brown, Ray Cabututan, and the Appellant escorted Mike Rameriz 
out of trailer #2. Billy Cayer remained with Eddie Apadaca in 
trailer #2. (T. 91-96). 
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Meanwhile Billy Cayer, who was drunk, tried to hit Eddie 
Apadaca several times. Eddie Apadaca testified he could hear Mike 
Rameriz being hit. A few minutes later Don Brown came back into 
trailer #2 and told Billy Cayer to leave Eddie Apadaca alone, and 
to gather his things and leave camp. (T. 96-97). 
As Eddie Apadaca exited trailer #2 and ran between trailers 
#1 and #2, he saw Mike Ramirez lying on the grounds being kicked 
by a blur of people standing around him. The Appellant then asked 
Eddie Apadaca if he was going to help his buddy just prior to 
striking Eddie Apadaca and knocking him down behind the trailers. 
After exiting trailer #2, was the first time that Eddie Apadaca 
recalled seeing the Appellant, when Appellant hit him. (T. 97-98, 
107). 
As soon as Eddie Apadaca returned to his feet, Ray Cabututan 
came at him with a wrench in his hand. Eddie Apadaca took off 
running to the north, stumbled over a batch of eggs, and then 
heard the Appellant say, "leave him alone11, "let him go", "let's 
finish this guy", or something like that. Eddie Apadaca did not 
know whether anyone was following him because it was pretty dark. 
After running about 60 feet, Eddie Apadaca looked back between the 
trailers and saw a blur of more than one person standing around 
Mike Ramirez. (T. 98-99). 
According to the testimony of Richard Anderson, another 
eyewitness, he went to bed that night around 10:00 p.m., contrary 
to the testimony of his roommate, Eric Tilley, who says that he 
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went to bed around 10:00 p.m., forty-five minutes after Anderson 
went to bed. Richard Anderson was awakened by a commotion around 
10:30 p.m. Eric Tilley was the first person to get up in trailer 
#1 and rousted Anderson out of bed. Richard Anderson stated, 
"let's not get involved11, and consequently Richard Anderson, Eric 
Tilley, and their roommate Sherman Gallardo waited four or five 
minutes before Sherman Gallardo opened the door to their trailer 
to look outside. (T. 113-114, 129-31, 165). 
Prior to the time the door was opened, Richard Anderson heard 
an unidentifiable voice say, "leave this camp before we kill you11. 
(T. 115). Eric Tilley and Richard Anderson then followed Sherman 
Gallardo and looked out the door after Sherman Gallardo, who said 
something to the people outside. (T. 131-21). Eric Tilley 
testified that Sherman Gallardo said, "cool it, Don11, and someone 
turned and responded with a threat that, f,if you don't want some 
of this, stay inside". (T. 169). Richard Anderson testified that 
when the door was first opened, Don Brown swung a crescent wrench 
at Richard Anderson and asked him if he wanted some of this. (T. 
118). But Ray Cabututan in contradiction testified that he was 
the only person who held the crescent wrench that night. (T. 600). 
Richard Anderson testified that the door remained open throughout 
the fight; Eric Tilley, however, in a sharp contradiction to 
Richard Anderson's testimony testified that the door was closed 
after Sherman Gallardo was threatened, and was reopened by Richard 
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Anderson only after a period of five to ten minutes. (T. 131-32, 
172). 
When Richard Anderson first looked out the door, he allegedly 
saw Don Brown, Ray Cabututan, Billy Cayer and the Appellant 
kicking and beating Mike Ramirez. (T. 116-117). In sharp 
contradiction, Eric Tilley, who was standing in front of Richard 
Anderson, testified that he saw only three people standing around 
one person lying on the ground and that those three people were 
Ray Cabututan, Billy Cayer, and either Don Brown or Appellant, who 
look alike. Since they possess the same build and color of hair. 
(T. 128, 158-59, 168). Because it was dark, Eric Tilley testified 
he was having trouble figuring out the identity of the victim 
lying on the ground and could not determine if the third standing 
person was Don Brown or the Appellant. (T. 159, 168-69, 174). 
B.ichard Anderson, in contradiction to Eric Tilleyfs testimony 
stated that he was able to see the persons and events by virtue of 
light emanating from the open doors of trailers #1 and #2. Eric 
Tilley testified that only one dim stove light was on in trailer 
#1. (T. 116, 445-47). Ray Cabututan testified he never saw any 
lights on in trailer #1 and stated that he could not identify 
people because it was pitch black that night, as there was no moon 
due to an overcast sky. (T. 590, 594, 597, 599-600). 
Richard Anderson testified that he did not see all of the 
rest of the fight because Sherman Gallardo and he took turns 
looking out the door. Richard Anderson also testified that the 
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Appellant did most of the beating during the times he was 
watching. The fight gradually moved from the front of trailer #2 
to behind the amphibian parked in front of trailer #1. Richard 
Anderson testified he saw the Appellant choking Mike Ramirez and 
saw him hitting him in the face behind the amphibian vehicle. He 
also saw Ray Cabututan hit Mike Ramirez several times with a 
wrench, prepare to stab Mike Ramirez with a knife, and then swung 
the knife at Sherman Gallardo when he said stop it. 
Significantly, Richard Anderson testified he never saw the 
Appellant with a weapon. (T. 117-19, 132, 138-40, 142-43, 151-52). 
During the fight Richard Anderson testified he heard the 
Appellant say to Mike Ramirez, ffyoufre blind in one eye and can't 
see out of the other one"; the Appellant repeatedly said ffyou 
shouldn't cut my partner Billy, I'm going to beat you for this"; 
"I'm going to kill you for stabbing my partner"; and someone said 
"he's not breathing". Ray Cabututan, on the other hand was in the 
same position as Richard Anderson and in sharp contradiction to 
the testimony of Richard Anderson testified that he could only 
hear the loud generator operating ten to fifteen feet from the 
fight. (T. 118-121, 591). 
Throughout the fight P.ichard Anderson testified that: he was 
emotional and scared. He considered Don Brown, Ray Cabututan, 
Billy Cayer, and the Appellant, who were all pretty drunk, to be 
dangerous, because drunks do things they would not ordinarily do. 
(T. 134-37, 140). 
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Richard Anderson further testified he considered the 
Appellant to be pompous and pushy. He did not care for what the 
Appellant stood for. They had been "snooty" to each other and 
exchanged angry words over a work-related accident, (T. 153-54). 
On the other hand, Richard Anderson liked Billy Cayer and 
thought he was a "pleasant gentleman". Richard Anderson testified 
that Billy Cayer disappeared shortly after he began watching the 
fight. (T. 117, 153). 
Although the fight lasted approximately 45 minutes, according 
to Anderson, all three of the occupants and witnesses of trailer 
#1 were military veterans armed with knifes and a large 
two-by-four, yet paradoxically, and to their shame no one in 
trailer #1 assisted Mike Ramirez. P.ichard Anderson testified he 
thought that the end result of the fight wuold be similar to other 
fights he had observed; namely, that Mike Ramirez would be 
battered and bruised, but otherwise allright. Richard Anderson 
testified he did not think the fight was likely to result in the 
death of Mike Ramirez. Similarly, Eric Tilley stated he would 
have tried to help Ramirez if he had thought the fight was likely 
to result in the death of Mike Ramirez. (T. 121, 134, 137-138, 
448). 
The time discrepancy of the time the fight lasted, with the 
testimony of Richard Anderson, was highlighted when Eric Tilley 
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testified it lasted no more than 15-20 minutes, and Mike Ramirez 
then got up, went into his trailer and washed himself off. Later, 
around midnight, Richard Anderson stated he saw the Appellant 
sitting on the amphibian. Thereafter, at about 2:30 a.m., Don 
Brown came over to trailer #1 to ask the occupants if they had 
seen anything, and Richard Anderson also saw the Appellant outside 
at this time. Don Brown and the Appellant were then seen drinking 
at the kitchen table of trailer #3. (T. 121-124, 160). 
Around 5:00 a.m. , Richard Anderson heard a knock on the door 
of trailer #1. When Richard Anderson and Sherman Gallardo opened 
the door, Mike Rameriz was seen sitting on the pallet outside the 
door. He asked them to call 911; told then he couldn't breath, 
and asked for a drink of water. After drinking some water, Mike 
Ramirez collapsed and died. (T. 125-26). 
The Appellant, who is 27 years old, testified that he is an 
alcoholic and has been a very heavy drinker since he was about 16 
years old. On the night in question, in conformity with his 
alcoholic character, he commenced his drinking around 7:30-8:00 
p.m. from a half-gallon bottle of Jack Daniels whiskey, a 
half-gallon bottle of vodka, and six beers that Don Brown had 
brought back from town. The Appellant steadily drank a 12 ounce 
cans of beer, 4-5 ounces of vodka, and 16-25 ounces of Jack 
Daniels prior to asking Eddie Apadaca to come over to trailer #1. 
(T. 458-470). 
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While Eddie Apadaca was in trailer #3, the Appellant drank 4 
more ounces of Jack Daniels. After Eddie Apadaca went back to 
trailer #2, Billy Cayer left trailer #3, followed by Ray 
Cabututan. Shortly, thereafter, the Appellant went looking for 
Billy Cayer and found him and Ray Cabututan in trailer #2 along 
with Eddie Apadaca and Mike Ramirez. When the Appellant entered 
the open door of trailer #2, he testified he saw Mike Ramirez 
holding a knife; Ray Cabututan was rummaging in the closet, and 
Billy Cayer was on a bunk trying to maul Eddie Apadaca. Don Brown 
came into trailer #2 about five or ten minutes later. (T. 
470-473). 
Ray Cabututan then pulled nunchuks out of the closet. The 
Appellant grabbed the nunchuks from Cabututan and threw them 
towards the trailer door, saying, "nunchuks was not needed11. The 
Appellant then told Mike Ramirez that the Appellant was going to 
get his friend (Cayer) out of there and proceeded toward Billy 
Cayer. At that time, Don Brown walked in the door and said to 
Mike Ramirez, "why don't you put your knife down?". (T. 474-75, 
607). When Mike Ramirez looked at Don Brown, the Appellant then 
punched Mike Ramirez in the side of his face. Ramirez fell on a 
bunk, and the Appellant then jumped on Ramirez, grabbed the hand 
with the knife, and punched Ramirez four or five more times in the 
head. Mike Ramirez's nose and lip started to bleed. Ramirez then 
got up and ran out the door. Ray Cabututan confirms that Mike 
Ramirez came out of the door by himself. (T. 474-75, 591-92). 
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It then took the Appellant approximately five minutes to get 
Billy Cayer off of Eddie Apadaca and out of trailer #2. When the 
Appellant and Billy Cayer exited trailer #2, the Appellant 
testified that he saw no one, but heard scuffling by the barrels 
in front of trailer #2. The Appellant then looked at Billy 
Cayer's arm, because Ray Cabututan had said, just prior to the 
Appellant grabbing and throwing the nunchukas away, that Mike 
Ramirez had stuck Billy Cayer with a knife. Billy Cayer's arm was 
bleeding, but not very badly, so Appellant said, "shit don't you 
cool out, because he's not hurt that badly". (T. 476-79, 586). 
Eddie Apadaca then came out of trailer #2 and said something 
derogatory to Billy Cayer and the Appellant. The Appellant 
followed Eddie Apadaca between the trailers to the west side of 
the trailers and punched Apadaca, who fell down. At the time the 
Appellant punched Eddie Apadaca he testified that he saw no one 
else behind the trailers. Eddie Apadaca got up quickly; ran to 
the north with the Appellant chasing him until he heard Apadaca 
run into the eggs covered with a tarp. (T. 479-81). 
As appellant came around the north side of trailer #1, he 
testified he saw Mike Ramirez lying face down and moaning about a 
foot behind the amphibian in front of trailer #1. The Appellant 
walked over, straddled Mike Ramirez, placed his hands and arms 
under Ramirez's shoulders, and tried to lift him. As he did so, 
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someone came up and kicked Mike Ramirez in the face. The 
Appellant said, "don't do thatM, and pushed Mike Ramirez's face 
toward the ground to protect him from the unidentifiable person 
now walking away, (T. 482-84). 
It took the Appellant a couple of minutes to lift Mike 
Ramirez up before he walked Mike Ramirez to his trailer. In 
response to Mike Ramirez saying he was dizzy, the Appellant 
suggested that Mike Ramirez lie down. Mike Ramirez then sat on 
the bed and the Appellant exited trailer #2 and went back to 
trailer #3. Before waking up the next morning, the last thing the 
Appellant remembers is having another drink when he returned to 
trailer #3. (T. 484-85) . 
The Appellant testified that he did not know how he acquired 
blood on his clothes and tennis shoes that night, although it was 
his rational and logical belief that the blood came from his fight 
with Mike P.amirez in trailer #2 and from assisting Mike Ramirez to 
his feet and back to the bed in trailer #2. Appellant testified 
he hit Mike Ramirez only with his fist, only in trailer #2, and 
only for the purpose of disarming him and getting his friend Billy 
Cayer out of the trailer. (T. 484-88, 493-95). 
In the morning the Appellant was told that Mike Ramirez was 
dead. After examing Mike Rameriz, the Appellant grabbed a shovel 
and entered the ATV vehicle, as he normally would do, to drive out 
of camp to a spot where he could go to the bathroom. Richard 
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Anderson and Eric Tilley testified that this procedure was common 
practice at the camp. After remembering that an outhouse had been 
built in the past week and completed the day before, the Appellant 
turned the ATV around to head back to camp, at which point, the 
ATV stalled. As the appellant got out of the ATV, he saw the 
police arriving and threw down the shovel, (T. 145, 175, 490-92, 
511-12). 
Based upon the Appellants testimony as to the amount of 
liquor he drank, Dr. Brian Finkle, an expert witness on the 
effects of alcohol as a toxic agent, testified regarding the blood 
alcohol level of a hypothetical person in the Appellant's 
circumstances. Dr. Finkle conservatively estimated that such a 
persons blood alcohol level would have reached a very high 0.382, 
and certainly no less than 0.30%, at the time the Appellant 
entered trailer #2. (T. 538-546). Dr. Finkle further testified 
that it was his expert opinion that alcohol severely affects one's 
mental capacity, which involves making judgments and decisions, 
and understanding the consequences of ones actions. The ability 
to process information from multiple inputs, process it, and then 
make a judgment or decision therefrom is very badly impaired even 
at very low alcohol levels. Substantially impaired, also, is the 
ability to perceive or recognize the severity of a fight and the 
24 
details thereof, such as the existence and extent of injuries to 
oneself and others, and the danger from something, such as a 
knife. An intoxicated person is likely to be operating purely at 
an emotional, instinctive level, as rational and logical thought 
falls away due to alcohol intoxication. (T. 554-565, 571-573). 
Dr. Finkel further noted that someone, such as the Appellant, who 
has been drinking heavily and steadily for over a decade, will 
develop a very considerable capacity to disguise the subjective, 
observable effects of alcohol on walking, talking, and the like. 
Nevertheless, at blood alcohol levels of 0.30% and above, an 
alcoholic may black out, i.e. experience a loss of memory, and be 
unable to disguise the alcohol's effects. Any memory loss would 
occur gradually as the person becomes more intoxicated so that 
person would more easily remember the first, rather than the last, 
drinks taken. (T. 551-552, 567, 570). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT - UTAH R. APP. P. RULE 24(a)(8) 
The Box Elder County Attorney committed plain error in 
repeatedly violating his prosecutorial duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a unjust conviction. On 
numerous occasions, during closing argument, the Box Elder County 
Attorney failed to limit his argument to the facts in evidence and 
legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom; instead he unduly 
relied upon expressions of personal opinion, inflammatory remarks 
and facts not taken in evidence. 
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The trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's 
Motion For Mistrial based upon the Box Elder County Attorneys 
improper and inflammatory statements made during closing 
statements. The trial court violated Appellant's constitutional 
right to a fair trial and committed reversible error in 
effectively denying the indigent Appellant the right to prepare an 
adequate defense, namely by not timely appointing to the defendant 
the assistance of a private investigator and a court appointed 
psychiatrist. The need for psychiatric evaluation was crucial in 
light of the Appellants severe intoxication, and particularly 
where the State of Utah placed Appellant's mental state at issue 
by charging him with second degree murder. 
Appellant's trial counsel made a timely objection to the 
trial date set by the District Court Judge; gave necessary notice 
for a Motion For Continuance, and made a reasonable effort to have 
the trial date rescheduled for good cause. The denial of 
Appellant's Motion For Continuance of the trial date severely 
impaired Appellant's defense counsels ability to adequately 
prepare, especially for cross-examination of the State's 
eyewitnesses based upon their numerous prior and contemporary 
conflicting statements. Consequently, the trial court violated 
Appellant's United States Sixth Amendment constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel and abused its discretion in 
denying a trial continuance to allow counsel adequate time to 
prepare. 
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If the trial court is not found by the Court to be 
responsible for denying Appellant effective assistance of counsel, 
then this Court must find that Appellant's trial counsel was 
responsible for a violation of the United States Constitution 
Sixth Amendment and Article I Section 12, Constitution of Utah 
right to effective assistance of counsel by failing to timely file 
a motion for psychiatric evaluation, and to adequately and in 
great scathing detail cross-examine the State's three eyewitnesses 
for the purpose of making clear to the jury the sharp 
discrepancies in the eyewitness testimony as it effected the 
Appellant. Appellant's defense counsel also failed to call 
character witnesses for the Appellant, despite Appellant's fervent 
requests, and defense counsel further failed to object, at all, to 
the numerous prosecutorial misstatements made to the jury during 
closing argument, 
A miscarriage of justice occurred when the trial judge 
responded to three jury requests for supplemental instructions 
regarding the crucial issue of intent by referring the jury to the 
instructions already before the jury, rather than clarifying the 
jury questions raised. 
Discharge of the jurys responsibility to draw appropriate 
inferences from the testimony taken depended solely on discharge 
of the trial judges duty to give the jury the required guidance by 
a lucid, clear statement of the relevant legal criteria 
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encompassed in the jury instructions. Discharge of the jurys fact 
finding responsibility also depended upon guidance from 
psychiatric testimony regarding the impact of alcohol on the 
defendant which they did not receive. 
Appellant alleges an abuse of discretion occurred when the 
trial court permitted the jury to deliberate for eight and 
one-half hours, after four full days of trial, until 1:20 a.m., 
thus, arguably depriving Appellant of the considered judgment of 
each juror. 
Discharge of the jurys duty to judge the evidence fairly 
and render a considered verdict depended upon the jury's view of 
the crime scene. The request for a jury view, which the trial 
judge refused to allow, further constituted an abuse of the 
court's discretion to see that a fair trial had occurred. The 
evidence adduced at trial did not adequately portray the lines of 
sight and dim light by which the eyewitnesses were, or were not 
able to see the events. In that setting, without question, sound 
judicial discretion should have granted to the jury the right to 
view the scene of the homicide for the purpose of assessing the 
weight to be given, in particular, to Richard Anderson's 
eyewitness testimony in light of the weighty, conflicting 
evidence. 
Finally, the multiple substantial errors committed by the Box 
Elder County Attorney in his closing argument made to the Court, 
Appellants trial counsels lack of adequate preperation, and the 
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trial court, in many instances, abuse of sound discretion amounted 
to cummulative error prejudicing Appellant's right to a fair 
trial. For example, the failure to provide Appellant with a 
pre-trial psychiatric evaluation denied the jury two crucial areas 
of consideration on a central issue of intent about which the jury 
evidenced substantial confusion. With proper jury instructions 
given, it is reasonably probable that the jury would have 
acquitted Appellant on the highest charge of second degree murder. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTION COMMITTED NUMEROUS PLAIN ERRORS 
AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
FAILING TO REMEDY SUCH ERRORS BFOUGHT TO ITS 
ATTENTION. 
In the trial of the Appellant, the Box Elder County Attorney 
committed numerous errors; particularly, in his closing argument 
that both individually and cummulatively affected the substantial 
right of the Appellant to a fair trial requiring reversal of 
Appellant's conviction for second degree murder. The prosecutor 
repeatedly violated the prosecutorial and ethical duty to refrain 
from improper remarks made to the jury panel which were calculated 
to incite a conviction on innuendo and evidence that was never 
introduced as part of the trial. The duty of a prosecuting 
attorney has been aptly described in Commonwealth v Gilman, 368 
A.2d 253 (Pa. 1977) wherein the Pennsylvania high court stated: 
lf[T]he prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer representing 
the Commonwealth. His duty is to seek justice, not 
just convictions.... 
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"Although the prosecutor operates within the 
adversary system, it is fundamental that his 
obligation is to protect the innocent as well 
as to convict the guilty, to guard the rights 
of the accused as well as to enforce the 
rights of the public.ff 
During closing argument, the prosecution has an 
obligation to 
"...present facts so that the jury can 
dispassionately and objectively evaluate the 
testimony in a sober and reflective frame of 
mind that will produce a judgment warranted by 
the evidence and not inspired by emotion or 
passion. 
The prosecutor's position as both an administrator of 
justice and an advocate "gives him a responsibility not 
to be vindicative or attempt in any manner to influence 
the jury by arousing their prejudices.11 In particular, 
the prosecutor must limit his argument to the facts in 
evidence and legitimate inferences therefrom11. 
(at 257 citations omitted). 
Two of the Box Elder County Attorneys statements were brought 
to the attention of the trial judge by way of Appellant's oral 
motion for a mistrial. (T. 669-70). The errors of which Appellant 
complained to the trial court were: (1) the prosecutor labelled 
the Appellant a "criminal11, and (2) the prosecutor repeatedly 
suggested to the jury that Appellant and Ray Cabututan, a 
co-defendant, who had received a separate trial, conspired to 
fabricate stories that would not implicate each other. (T. 628-29, 
665, 666). There was never any evidence adduced that a jury could 
reasonably infer Ray Cabatutan with the Appellant conspired to 
commit perjury. As more fully discussed below, these and other 
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prosecutorial errors require reversal of Appellant's conviction. 
The Appellant asserts that the trial courts passive denial of the 
motion for mistrial constituted an abuse of discretion and the 
prosecutors remarks constituted plain error. 
An abuse of discretion occurs when, taking into account any 
remedial measures ordered by the trial court, the prejudice to the 
defendant still satisfies the standard for reversible error set 
forth in Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 30. Errors and defects. The 
remedial measures requested, but refused would have obviated the 
prejudice. State v Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 918 (UT 1987). The Utah 
Supreme Court has ruled in several cases that the Rule 30 standard 
"^..affect the substantial rights of a party...." means an error 
warrants reversal only if, without the error, there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant. Id. at 919. 
The likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently 
high to undermine confidence in the verdict. Ld. at 920. The 
degree of likelihood required lies somewhere between a "mere 
possibility11 and "more probable than not" that the outcome of 
trial would have been different. Id. at 920. 
The plain error test of Rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence is two-pronged. State v Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (UT 
1989). First, the error must be an obvious one, one of which the 
trial court should have been aware at the time it was committed. 
Id. n.ll and; Second, the Appellant must show that there is a 
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reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome below 
would have been more favorable. Id. at 122. The second prong is 
the same standard courts apply in determining whether an abuse of 
discretion has occurred. This two-pronged test is not rigid in 
its application, since the degree of error may well affect the 
appellate courts judgment as to the obviousnesss of the error. 
Id. n.12. The plain error rule ultimately involves a balancing 
for the need for procedural regularity against the demands of 
fairness. 
A. The Prosecution's Stigmitization of Appellant as a 
Criminal The prosecuting attorneys stigmitization of Appellant 
as a "criminal11 was an unprofessional expression, inferentially, 
of the prosecution's personal belief as to Appellant's guilt. See 
Gilman, 368 A.2d at 258. It has been held that the prosecution 
may not express its personal opinion regarding a defendants guilt, 
credibility, or trial strategy. Consequently, the trial court 
should have been aware of the error at the time it was committed 
in order to initiate curative action and in this case, as such, 
the first prong of the plain error rule is satisfied. 
Under similar circumstances, where the prosecutor described 
the Appellant as a "hoodlum" to the jury panel, the appellate 
court held that the trial court, on its own motion should have 
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initiated curative action in regard to the prejudicial remark, and 
immediately instructed the jury to disregard the improper remark. 
Hall v United States, 419 F.2d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 1969). The Hall 
court properly reasoned that this type of shorthand 
characterization of an accused, not based on evidence, is 
especially likely to stick in the minds of the jury and influence 
its deliberations. Particularly onerous to concepts of justice and 
fair play occurs when the characterization emanates from the 
authority of the Sovereign; that is, the Box Elder County 
Attorney. 
In this case, the trial court did not take curative action 
and instruct the jury to disregard the Box Elder County Attorney's 
remark that the Appellant was a criminal. Instead, the trial 
court gave added credibility and weight to the prosecutors 
statement, implying that Appellant was already presumed guilty, in 
stating that the stigmitization of Appellant was a logical 
extension of the facts, in that, "if [Appellant] murdered a man, 
he's a criminal". (T. 671) Based upon this deductive logic 
exercised by the trial court to the jury panel, the court denied 
Appellant's motion for a mistrial without taking any remedial 
action. 
The standard of the abuse of discretion test and the second 
prong of the plain error rule has been met. Based upon the facts 
set forth below, Appellant argues that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that a more favorable outcome of the jury verdict could 
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have occurred in absence of the error because of: 
(1) the strong likelihood that the egregious "criminal" 
stigmitization of the Appellant influenced the jury deliberations; 
(2) the Appellant had asserted the defense that he was 
incapable of forming the necessary intent to commit second degree 
murder due to his voluntary intoxication and that, at most, he 
should only be found guilty of manslaughter; 
(3) the Appellant asserted the defense that he did not 
participate in the beating of the victim that took place outside 
the trailer house; that the acts that occurred, arguably, rendered 
the crime a second degree murder, rather than some lessor-included 
offense; 
(4) notice must be taken that not only was there conflicting 
testimony from the prosecutions witnesses as to whether Appellant 
was involved in the beating that took place outside of trailer 
house #2, but also there was substantial evidence that Appellant 
was severely intoxicated on the night the victim was beaten; 
(5) the lengthy nature (more than eight hours) of the jury's 
deliberations; and 
(6) the obvious doubts of the jurors regarding the issue of 
intent, which was evidenced by the jurors questions submitted to 
the trial court regarding intent. 
As a result the judge's denial of the motion for mistrial 
constituted an abuse of discretion, and the prosecutors remarks 
constituted plain error. 
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Bv The Unsupported Assertion That Appellant and Codefendant 
Conspired To Fabricate Their Accounts of The Events 
The Hall, infra, case is instructive on the ethical 
impropriety of the Box Elder County Attorney's repeated bald 
assertions to the jury panel that the Appellant and co-defendant 
Ray Cabututan were "protecting each other" by having discussed the 
events prior to trial and ITcom[ing] up with a story" by which 
"they kind of weave the truth in with the lies". (T. 628-29). In 
the Hall case, the prosecutor argued to the jury that the 
defendant had tampered with a witness who did not appear at trial. 
The only evidence relating to the witness nonattendance was the 
defendant's testimony that he was a friend of the witness and that 
he had visited the witness about a week before trial to try to get 
the witness to come to the trial. Hall at 584. The court found 
that the inference of witness tampering could not be reasonably 
deduced from what meager facts were in evidence, and therefore the 
prosecution should not have made the assertions. Hall at 585. 
Similarly, in the instant case, the only facts relating to 
the purported collaboration of Appellant and Ray Cabututan were 
that they are friends because of their employment, and that they 
spent time together after the commission of the crime and before 
trial. From these meager facts, no inference of collaboration 
could be reasonably adduced that would raise to the level of a 
conspiracy of fabrication that could be reasonably argued to the 
jury. 
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The assertion of collaboration, like the assertion of witness 
tampering in Hall goes to the integrity of the trial itself. See 
Hall, 419 F.2d at 585. When the improper and inflammatory remarks 
were made by the Box Elder County Attorney, the trial court should 
have, at a minimum, immediately sustained an objection and clearly 
instructed the jury that the argument was not supported by the 
evidence. That Appellant argues this was the appropriate curative 
initiative that should have been taken by the trial court. 
Again, the trial court abused its discretion by taking no remedial 
action and denying Appellan's motion for a mistrial. (T. 669-671). 
Furthermore, such a blunt assertion of a fact, not in evidence, 
nor reasonably deducible from facts in evidence constitutes plain 
error. See United States v Guajardo-Melendez, 401 F.2d 35, 40-41 
(7th Cir. 1968); United States v Fearns, 501 F.2d 486, 489 (7th 
Cir. 1974). The prosecutor violated the fundamental rule, known 
to every lawyer, that closing argument is Limited to the facts in 
evidence. This underhanded attack on Appellant's credibility 
during closing argument was made for the sole purpose to undermine 
confidence in the jury process since Appellant's credibility was 
crucial to his defenses of incapacity to form the requisite intent 
due to voluntary intoxication, self-defense, and lack of 
participation in the beating that occurred outside the trialer. 
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C. Repeated Opinions of the Veracity of Appellant and 
Codefendant Plain error was also committed by the prosecutor 
by labelling the Appellant and the co-defendant Ray Cabututan as 
"liars11, and repeatedly expressing its opinion to the jury panel 
that they were "lying", or "not telling the truth" Cf., State v 
Miller, 157 S.E.2d 335, 345 (N.C. 1967) (new trial granted because 
of numerous prosecutorial errors, including calling a witness a 
liar and expressing an opinion about a witness1 veracity); State v 
Reed, 684 P.2d 699, 702-03 (Wash. 1984) (defendant denied right to 
fair trial by, among other things, prosecution's repeatedly 
calling defendant a "liar" and asserting its personal opinion of 
credibility of a witness). In Miller the court reasoned: 
"...the trial judge should not permit counsel in his 
argument's to indulge in vulgarities, he should, 
therefore, refrain from abusive, vituperative, and 
opprobrious language, or from indulging in invectives 
or from aking any statements or reflections which have 
no place in argument but are only calculated to cause 
prejudice...it is the duty of judge to interfere 
when the remarks of counsel are not warranted by the 
evidence, and are calculated to mislead or prejudice 
the jury " (at 345-46). 
On at least eight occasions the prosecution expressed its 
opinion as to the lack of veracity of the Appellant and the 
co-defendant Ray Cabututan labelling them as liars (T. 617, 627, 
628, 631, 634, 635, 667). The Box Elder County Attorney should 
have limited his remarks to the evidence adduced at trial and 
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argued why the jury should not believe Appellant and co-defendant, 
because, among other reasons, ,f[q]uite frequently conflicting 
evidence in a case is not due to lying but to an honest mistake or 
other factors ...." Id. at 345. The trial court, at the time 
these prejudicial remarks were made, should have been aware that 
they constituted errors and taken swift, immediate curative 
action. 
One of the most inflammatory statements occurred when the 
Box Elder County Attorney stated to the jury panel11 
"It's interesting to note that [Ray Cabututan's] story and 
this defendant's story mesh fairly well. Why do you 
think that is? You know, it's almost as if maybe they've 
talked about this and perhaps come up with a story. It's 
interesting to note that neither of them really involves 
the other in their stories. You notice that they kind of 
weave the truth in with the lies. If you notice lots of 
liars do it, they won't tell a whole lie, not have any of 
the truth because no one will believe that. So what you 
do is mix a little truth in with the lie and you hope 
that somebody will buy it. That's exactly what they did 
in this case". (T. 576, 635) 
That line of argument, was in essence, the unfounded 
conspiracy to lie theory propounded to the jury panel by the Box 
Elder County Attorney that was not supported by the evidence. 
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D. Referencing Codefendant1s Conviction For Same Offense 
Another noteworthy prejudicial prosecutorial error occurred 
when the Box Elder County Attorney twice referred to the fact that 
the co-defendant Ray Cabututan, was convicted of second degree 
murder at his separate trial. (T. 576, 635). In United States v 
Austin 786 F.2d 986, 991 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v 
Griffin, 778 F.2d 707, (11th Cir. 1985) the court held: "Due to 
the extreme and unfair prejudice suffered by defendants in similar 
situations, courts and prosecutors generally are forbidden from 
mentioning that a codefendant has either pled guilty or been 
convicted11, (at 710). Numerous courts have held that 
prosecutorial references made to the fact of a conviction or 
guilty plea of a co-defendant or co-conspirator constitute plain 
error. See, Austin, 786 F.2d at 992; United States v Miranda, 593 
F.2d 590, 594-95 (5th Cir. 1979). Like the prosecuting attorney 
in the Miranda case, the Box Elder County Attorney not only 
improperly urged the jury to consider co-defendants conviction as 
proof of Appellant's guilt, but the argument made was improper 
because it was based upon evidence not in the record. See Austin 
at 594 and further, inferentially, was made to the jury as some 
evidence that the Appellant too must be guilty because of his 
association with Ray Cabatutan who had already been convicted. 
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It is fundamental criminal law and axiomatic thereto that the 
prosecution may not refer to facts not presented as evidence, as 
was done here, and then let the jury draw the prejudicial 
conclus ion that Ray Cabatutan, a convicted felon, in concert with 
the Appellant killed Mike Ramirez. On two occasions the 
prosecution informed the jury of the fact that co-defendant Ray 
Cabututan had raised the identical defense of self-defense that 
was raised by Appellant, The Box Elder County Attorney argued to 
the jury: 
"Why should we believe the eyewitnesses over the 
defendant and Mr. Cabututan? In the instructions, the 
judge told you that you can take into consideration of 
course the witness1 interest in the case. What 
interest does this defendant have? Obvoiusly he does 
not want to be convicted of this crime. He has a very 
great interest in not telling you the truth on the 
stand. What interest did Mr. Cabututan have? He had 
the same interest in lying as did this defendant. 
Remember, Mr. Cabututan raised basically the same 
defenses; I did it in self-defense. Are you going to 
believe him? Remember, Mr. Cabututan was convicted of 
second degree murder11. (T. 634-35) 
The remarks made by the Box Elder County Attorney were 
prejudicial by labelling Appellant and Mr. Cabututan as '"liars" 
and suggesting to the jury that they should reject Appellant's 
self-defense claim and convict him of second degree murder upon 
the premise that since Ray Cabututanfs self-defense claim was 
rejected and he was convicted, inferentially so should the jury 
convict the Appellant. 
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E. Comparing The Strength of the Evidence to That of Other 
gases The Box Elder County Attorney later concluded his 
closing argument by making yet another extremely prejudicial 
reference to evidence that was not in the record. He stated: 
"it's rare that you get a murder with eyewitnesses. You 
can't get much more than eyewitnesses, physical 
evidence, and expert testimony, and you've got all three, 
ladies and gentlemen". (T. 688) 
The prosecution made a comparable prejudicial remark in its 
opening statement. (T. 36). The implication made was that the 
evidence against Appellant was much stronger than that introduced 
against most other defendants in murder cases because here, unlike 
other murder cases, he had tried, you had eyewitnesses and was 
improperly based upon the prosecutor's personal experiences which 
may not be considered by the jury. Where similar comments were 
made, the Miranda court found plain error in the prosecution's 
alluding to the fact that the co-defendant had been convicted on 
much weaker evidence than the evidence introduced against 
defendant. 
F. Misstating the Testimony Regarding Appellant's 
Intoxication The Box Elder County Attorney also committed plain 
error by misstating the evidence relating to the crucial issue of 
Appellant's level of intoxication. See United States v Brainard, 
690 F.2d 1117, 1122-23 (4th Cir. 1982) (prosecutor committed plain 
error in misquoting defendant in regards to the only disputed 
issue); Fearns, 501 F.2d at 489 (plain error to state facts not in 
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evidence); Guajardo-Melendez, 401 F.2d at 40-41 (plain error to 
state facts not in evidence). The Box Elder County Attorney 
stated to the jury the following in his closing argument: 
MBut no one, other than this defendant, says he was so 
drunk that he couldnft form the intent to [commit the 
crime]. As a matter of fact, he seems to move just 
fine as far as Eddie's concerned and as far as Richard 
Anderson;s concerned and as far as Eric Tilley1s 
concerned, he's doing just fine....everybody who 
saw him after [drinking] didn't notice any staggering, 
slurred speech, anything like that". (T. 630, 667) 
In point of fact, as testified to in the trial, neither Eddie 
Apadaca, nor Richard Anderson, nor Eric Tilley testified that 
Appellant seemed to be moving, "just fine or that they did not 
notice any staggering or slurred speech". To the contrary, 
Richard Anderson testified Appellant was drunk; Eddie Apadaca 
testified Appellant did not seem quite drunk, and lastly Eric 
Tilley stated he could not tell if the defendants were drunk, but 
figured they were drunk. (T. 103, 136, 140, 160, 173). In State v 
Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1124 (UT 1982) the Utah Supreme Court in 
addressing the issue of harmless error stated: 
"Since the error identified above affected the 
defendants sixth amendment right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses, it can be held harmless onLy 
if this court is 'able1 to declare a belief that it is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt", (at 1124) 
The State of Utah has the burden of establishing that the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v Verde, 
770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (UT 1989). 
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G. Disparaging the Legitimate Defense Strategy of Admitting 
to a Lesser-Included Offense The prosecutions diparagement of 
the legitimate defense strategy of admitting a lesser degree of 
guilt and seeking acquittal of the higher degree also exceeded the 
bounds of permissible argument. See Commonwealth v Gilman, 368 
A.2d at 258. In Gilman the prosecution improperly described such 
a defense strategy as an attempt to "sneak out11 with a lesser 
verdict. In this case, the Box Elder County Attorney improperly 
ridiculed Appellant's defense strategy by stating; "obviously, 
this defendant would love to be convicted of something less than 
second degree murder...." (T. 662). In sum, "sneak out" with a 
lesser verdict. 
H. Comments Made By The Box Elder County Attorney That Were 
Only Calculated To Cause Prejudice 
Other comments were made by the Box Elder County Attorney 
during the trial which were specifically calculated to cause jury 
prejudice and as a result, it is argued, they too constituted 
error. The Box Elder County Attorney stated: 
(a) "At the beginning of this case, defense counsel told you 
that his client was trying to help the decedent, Mike Ramirez. 
After hearing the evidence, I would submit to you that if he was 
trying to help him, it was just to help him out of this life and 
nothing else". (T. 617). 
(2) "[This defendant is] out there just having a good old 
time beating that man...." (T. 630). 
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I. Vouching For the Credibility of a Frosecution Witness 
Finally, the prosecution committed plain error in vouching 
for the credibility of Richard Anderson, (T. 665) , see Untied 
States v Ludwig, 508 F.2d 140, 143 (10th Cir. 1974), and otherwise 
continually interjecting his personal opinions on such matters 
regarding Richard Andersonfs credibility. (T. 625, 627, 629, 631, 
632, 633, 636, 663, 664, 667). It was prejudicial error for the 
Box Elder County Attorney to inject his personal opinion regarding 
Richard Anderson's credibility, thereby clearly and improperly 
intruding upon the jury's exclusive function of evaluating the 
credibility of witnesses. In such a case, without the court 
immediately intervening and taking curative action in regard to 
the Box Elder County Attorney vouching for the credibility of a 
witness, a jury has no choice but to give such statements full 
credibility to the statements made, since they came through 
unchallenged by and through the power and prestige of the office 
of the Box Elder County Attorney. See Gilman, 368 A.2d at 258-59. 
As previously noted, it has been firmly established by case law 
that a prosecutor may not express his personal opinion regarding a 
defendants guilt, credibility or trial strategy. Id. at 258. 
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J. CUMULATIVE ERROR 
Even assuming, argumento, that none of the foregoing 
substantial errors, in and of themselves, constituted reversible 
error, the cumulative impact of the errors prejudiced Appellant's 
right to a fair trial and thus constituted reversible error. See 
State v Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (UT 1986). There are 
striking similarities between this case and the Gilman and Reed 
cases previously cited, where, in each case, numerous 
prosecutorial errors were found to have denied the defendants 
right to a fair trial. Gilman 368 A.2d at 259; Reed, 684 P.2d at 
701-703. 
Like the Gilman case, the trial of this case involved the 
following prosecutorial errors: 
(1) disparaging a legitimate defense strategy of admitting a 
lesser-included offense; 
(2) stigmatizing the defendant with prejudicial labels; that 
is a criminal and liar; 
(3) improper expressions of personal beliefs as to the 
defendants guilt and credibility; and 
(4) appealing to the jury's passions and prejudice by 
stating to the jury that; "At the beginning of this case, defense 
counsel told you that his client was trying to help the decedent, 
Mike Ramirez. After hearing the evidence, I would submit to you 
that if he was trying to help him, it was just to help him out of 
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this life and nothing else[;]", and "[this defendant is] out 
there just having a good old time beating that man ...." In 
Gilman the prosecution stated that the defendant beat the victim 
"like a dog .. until there were no more groans or moans, coming 
out of that human body". 368 A.2d at 259. 
Like the Reed case, the trial of the present case involved 
the following facts: 
(1) the prosecutor expressed his personal beliefs as to the 
defendant's guilt and credibility, including calling the defendant 
a liar on numerous occasions; 
(2) a crucial defense was raised that the defendant, due to 
severe intoxication, was incapable of forming the requisite intent 
to commit the highest degree of murder charged; 
(3) the prosecutor's comments struck directly at the 
evidence which supported the defendants intoxication defense by 
attacking its credibility by improper means; and 
(4) the State's assertion that the defendant had the 
necessary criminal intent to commit a homicide was not, contrary 
to the State's assertions, overwhelming. 
Both individually and cumulatively the numerous plain errors 
made by the Box Elder County Attorney require that the court 
reverse Appellant's conviction. 
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POINT II 
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL, A FAIR TRIAL, DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION BY VAPIOUS REVERSIBLE ERRORS COMMITTED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Appellant asserts that the facts of this case affirmatively 
demonstrate that the Appellant did not receive effective 
assistance of counsel, a fair trial, due process of law, or equal 
protection under the law in violation of his United States 
Constitutional guarantees of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
and State of Utah constitutional right as guaranteed by Article I 
Section 12. The only issue is whether the reversible error should 
be attributed to the trial court, or Appellant's trial counsel. 
Jack H. Molgard or both. 
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Ake v Oklahoma 
strongly supports the conclusion that the trial court was the 
erring party in this trial. 470 U.S. 68, 76-87, 105 S Ct. 1087. 
1092-98, 84 L Ed. 2d 53 (1985). In Ake the United States Supreme 
Court held that a state is required to provide an indigent 
defendant with the assistance of a psychiatrist to support his 
insanity defense based, in part, upon the following reasoning: 
"The Court has long recognized that when a State brings 
its judicial power to bear on in indigent defendant in 
a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to assure 
tEat the defendant has a fair opportunity to present 
his defense. This elementary principle, grounded in 
significant part on the Fourteenth Amendments due 
process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives from 
tEe belief that justice cannot be equal, where, simply 
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as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the 
opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial 
proceeding in wnich his liberty is at stake.. . .To 
implement this principle, we have focused on 
identifying the "basic tools of an adequate defense or 
appeal", and we have required that such tools be 
provided to those defendants who cannot afford to pay 
for them...Three factors are relevant to this 
determination. The first is the private interest that 
will be affected by the action of the State. The 
second is the governmental interest that will be 
affected if the safeguard is to be provided. The third 
is the probable value of the additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if 
those safeguards are not provided. 
The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal 
proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty 
at risk is almost uniquely compelling....At the 
same time, it is difficult to identify any interest of 
the State, other than that in its economy, that weighs 
against recognition of this right....We therefore 
conclude that the governmental interest in denying Ake 
lERe assistance of a psychiatrist is not substantial, in 
Tight of the compelling interest of Both the state and 
the individual in accurate dispositions". 
470 U.S. at 76-79, 105 S. Ct. at 1092-94 (citations omitted; 
emphasis added). 
The Court then cited to numerous state statues, including 
Utah Code Anno. §77-32-1, and other court decisions which 
recognized an indigent defendants right to the assistance of a 
psychiatrist's expertise as reflecting: 
"[the] reality ... that when the State has made the 
defendant's mental condition relevant to this criminal 
culpability and to the punishment he might suffer, the 
assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial of the 
defendants ability to marshall his defense". 
470 U.S. at 80, 105 S. Ct. at 1095. From these strong judicial 
pronouncements it is not difficult to conclude that the trial 
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court here violated Appellants Federal and State constitutional 
rights to a fair trial, where as here, the Appellantfs state of 
mind, compounded by excessive drinking, should have been properly 
evaluated by a psychiatrist in light of the fact the Appellant was 
a chronic alcholic and presented to the jury for its 
deliberations. 
A. Belated Appointment of a Private Investigator To Assist 
The Appellant 
The trial court after being requested, initially refused to 
appoint, and then reluctantly and belatedly appointed a private 
investigator to assist Appellant's trial counsel, Jack H. Molgard, 
in pretrial investation and preparation, thus prejudicing 
Appellant's right to a fair trial and requiring reversal of his 
conviction. Factually, the prejudice occurred as follows: On 
October 31, 1989, Appellant's appointed trial counsel, Jack H. 
Molgard, made an oral motion for the appoitnment of a private 
investigator to assist him in pretrial investigation and 
preparation. The circuit court denied the motion on November 3, 
1990. (R.10-11, 24). On November 20, 1989, seventeen days later, 
Appellant and the co-defendants filed with the District Court a 
written Motion For Appointment of Private Investigator for 
Discovery and preparation of Defendant's cases pursuant to U.C.A. 
77-32-1(3) . Minimum standards provided by County for defense of 
indigent defendants. (R. 14-18). The District Court trial judge 
did not enter an Order appointing a private investigator for 
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Appellant until January 17, 1990, more than two months after the 
initial request for a private investigator and less than three 
weeks before the trial date of February 5, 1990. (R. 197-198) 
(Emphasis Added). 
U.C.A. 77-32-1(3) statutorily requires each county to provide 
indigent persons with the investigatory and other facilities 
necessary to prepare a due process of law defense. Moreover, an 
indigent defendant has a right, cognizable by the Federal 
constitution, to the appointment of an investigator or expert at 
State expense to assist in the preparation and presentation of his 
defense. Wharton's Criminal Procedure (12th Ed.) §414. The State 
of Utah's duty to provide an indigent with the means for an 
appropriate defense stems from a just interplay of the 
constitutional right to counsel, to a fair trial, and due process 
of law. State v Rush, 217 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1966). See also, Ake, 
470 U.S. 68, 76-87, 105 S Ct. 1087, 1092-98. As in the Ake case 
supra., the governmental interest in denying the assistance 
requested to save some money is not substantial in light of the 
compelling interest of both the state and the individual in a fair 
trial. Obviously, the use of a private investigator to perform 
certain duties that the attorney would otherwise have to perform 
usually is cost effective for the State of Utah, in that valuable 
and costly attorney billable time is not wasted on work that 
otherwise a competent investigator would normally do. 
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Like the Ake case, U.C.A. 77-32-1(3) manifests the value and 
importance attributed to providing indigent defendants with the 
assistance requested, namely private investigatory assistance, at 
least in the State of Utah. The facts of this case clearly 
demonstrate that a grave risk of a denial of due process of law 
existed if such private investigatory assistance was not rendered, 
especially where, as here, the criminal charge made were extremely 
grave and involved many conflicting versions made by eyewitnesses, 
and a factual issue was raised in regard to the lighting at the 
s^ene of the crime which affected the eyewitnesses ability to 
perceive the beating, and who was involved in the fatal beating. 
For example, the State of Utah notified Appellant's trial counsel 
that there would be twenty or more witnesses involved. The various 
written and recorded statements of Don Brown, the State's three 
key eyewitnesses, Richard Anderson, Eric Tilley, and Eddie 
Apadaca, as well as another eyewitness, Sherman Gallardo, who 
disappeared prior to the preliminary hearing, contained numerous 
conflicting and different statements of fact. Because of the 
number of witness statements taken; the conflicting factual 
versions contained therein; the discrepancies between the 
witnesses' stories and Appellant's recollection of the events, it 
was necessary to the preparation of an adequate defense that a 
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private investigator be appointed to assist in interviewing the 
witnesses; to point out inconsistencies to the witnesses, and 
attempt to decipher the truth prior to the preliminary hearing 
held on December 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd of 1989. Of 
particular importance, Eric Tilley had stated that he saw only 
three individuals, Billy Cayer, Ray Cabututan, and either Don 
Brown or the Appellant standing around Mike Ramirez when the door 
to trailer house #1 was first opened, whereas in contradiction 
Richard Anderson stated he saw all four men at that time, Richard 
Anderson's account of the Appellant's involvement in the fight 
also differed markedly from that of Appellant. 
The Utah Supreme Court has rightfully recognized that "the 
preliminary hearing is an important step in the criminal process 
in that it serves as both a discovery device and a means to 
preserve evidence for trial." State v Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1095 
(Utah 1988). Once a witness testifies under oath at a preliminary 
hearing they are less likely to change their stories if presented 
with inconsistencies in their statements, or discrepancies between 
their testimony and that of others. If a preliminary hearing is 
to fully and effectively serve its purposes, the Appellant must 
have the opportunity to interview witnesses prior thereto, so that 
witnesses may take account of discrepancies and inconsistencies 
before their testimony is preserved, and as it were cast in stone. 
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If a private investigator had been appointed by the Circuit 
Court Judge and had been available to take pictures of the crime 
scene prior to the preliminary hearing, these pictures could have 
been shown to the witnesses to facilitate their recollection of 
exactly who and what they were able to see or not see from various 
vantage points• Most notably, Richard Anderson's testimony 
regarding the events occurring behind the amphibian is highly 
suspect, since arguably the amphibian would have obstructed his 
view. The Appellant's defense was also hampred by the lack of 
information regarding the background of Mike Ramirez and his 
character for violence and all of the key witnesses, all 
transients, that could have been investigated by a private 
investigator. Without such information, Appellant was severely 
restricted in challenging their credibility, or in showing that 
the victim possessed a violent character in support of the 
Appellant's contention that he was acting in self-defense. The 
problem of the use and need for a private investigator was obvious 
at the time of the preliminary hearing and became more acute as 
the matter neared the trial date. A motion was made to the trial 
court for the appointment of a private investigator on November 
20, 1989 but one was not appointed until January 17, 1990 three 
weeks before the trial date of February 5, 1990. Such belated 
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appointment had a devastating effect on the ability of defense 
counsel to prepare, and to make the trial a truly powerful truth 
seeking adversarial contest. 
The foregoing leaves little doubt that both the Appellant's 
State and Federal due process of law constitutional right was 
violated, requiring this court to reverse his conviction by the 
belated appointment, by the trial court, of a private investigator 
to assist the Appellant in his preparation. 
B* The Denial of Appellant's Motion For Psychiatric 
Assistance Appellant argues the First Judicial District Court 
further violated the Appellantfs United States Sixth and 
Fourteenth Constitutional Amendment guaranteed rights and State of 
Utah constitutional rights under Article I Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution by denying the Appellant's Motion To Appoint a 
Psychiatrist and Expert Personnel and Motion To Allow 
Psychological Testing and Mental Evaluation. On January 16, 1990, 
thirteen days after the District Court Arraignment of the 
Appellant on January 3, 1990, Jack H. Molgard belatedly filed with 
the trial court the motion along with a Notice of Intent To Call 
Psychiatric and Other Expert Witnesses and a Notice of Intent To 
Claim Lack of Capacity to Form Intent made for the exclusive 
purpose of establishing, by expert psychiatric testimony, that the 
Appellant was unable to form the necessary intent to commit second 
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degree murder because of Appellant1s voluntary intoxication. (R. 
185-86, 189-90, 194-96). The trial court denied Appellantfs 
multiple motions, and would not allow any expert testimony on the 
Appellant's ability to form the requisite criminal mens rea 
intent, because the trial court believed that the motions and 
notices had not been filed timely; that is as soon as practicable 
after the time of arraignment, as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§77-14-3(1)(2). Mental Illness Defense Notice Requirement. (R. 
239; January 18, 1990) (Hearing Transcript, 18-19, 23-24, 44). 
In $o ruling, the trial court committed error since it was a 
denial of due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution for the State to deny 
an indigent defendant the needed assistance of a psychiatric 
expert, where as here, the defendant's mental state at the time of 
the offense was a substantial factor in his defense. See Ake, 470 
U.S, 68, 76-87, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1092-98. C.f., State v Woods, 
648 P.2d 71, 88 (Utah 1981) ("The refusal to grant an indigent 
defendant's timely motion for psychiatric assistance in a capital 
case is an abuse of discretion....It is also a denial of due 
process"). The following mens rea, mental state required by Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-203(1) for a conviction of guilty of second degree 
murder are stated as: 
(1) intentionally or knowingly causing the death of another; 
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(2) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another; 
(3) commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that 
causes the death of another; 
(4) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life engages in conduct which 
creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another. 
See State v Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 263-65 (Utah 1988). In this 
case, expert psychiatric testimony was crucial to the central 
issue of whether the Appellant, due to voluntary intoxication, was 
unable to form the requisite intent to commit the homocide. 
While the fundamental right to due process of law may be 
waived, such waiver may not be presumed from the untimely filing 
of a motion absent a showing that the waiver was knowingly and 
voluntarily made. State v McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 
1980); State v Studham, 655 P.2d 669, 670 (Utah 1982). In 
McCximber the trial court denied defendant's motion for severance 
of various counts of the indictment due to the defendant's failure 
to timely file the motion within the statutory time limits. Id. 
at 356. Because joinder of the counts jeopardized the defendant's 
fundamental right of due process of law, and since it was not 
affirmatively demonstrated that defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his rights, the Utah Supreme Court declared 
that the denial of the motion, "must be regarded as an abuse of 
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discretion[, ]fl Id. McCumber at 356 requiring a reversal of 
defendant's conviction. C^f, State v Miller, 677 P.2d 1129 (Utah 
1984) (the exclusion of expert psychiatric testimony on the issue 
of intent was found to be reversible error); State v Sessions, 645 
P.2d 643, 645 (Utah 1982) ("basic rules of evidence pertaining to 
materiality and relevance require that a defendant have the right 
to adduce 
evidence which would tend to disprove the existence of specific 
intent"). The facts in this case do not demonstrate that the 
Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his due process right 
to the assistance of a psychiatric expert by failing to comply 
with the statutory time limits. To the contrary, at the time the 
I 
motions and notices were filed, Jack H. Molgard, Appellant's trial 
counsel, was unaware of the existance of U.C.A. 77-14-3 and the 
time limits contained therein. As such, the Appellant may now be 
asked by the Court to pay the heavy price of waiver, because of 
the error of his counsel regarding knowing the statutory terms of 
U.C.A. 77-14-3 and its time limitations. Consequently, the trial 
court's denial of Appellant's motions jeopardized the Appellant's 
due process rights because of his trial counsels negligent 
attention to the pertinent statutory provision heretofore stated 
and must be held to be reversible error. 
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POINT 111 
THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR 
CONTINUANCE CONSTITUTED A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
AND A VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The First Judicial District Court committed reversible error 
by denying the Appellant's Motion for Continuance of the trial 
date set. While the granting of a continuance is within the sound 
discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed 
absent a clear abuse of discretion, an abuse may be found where a 
party has made timely objections, given necessary notice and made 
a reasonable effort to have the trial date reset for good cause, 
as occurred in this criminal case. State v Creviston, 646 P.2d 
750, 752 (Utah 1982). The denial of a motion for continuance may 
also constitute reversible error on the ground that the denial 
effectively obviated defendant's United States Constitutional 
guarantee to effective assistance of counsel whereby counsel lacks 
sufficient time to prepare his defense. See Hintz v Beto, 379 
F.2d 937, 942 (5th Cir. 1967) (among other things, the lawyer was 
denied the opportunity to review and analyze a psychiatric 
report). 
On January 3, 1990, the trial court arraigned the Appellant 
and scheduled the trial for February 5, 1990 through February 9, 
1990, over the strong oral objections of Appellant's counsel. In 
denying the Motion For Continuance of trial date, the trial court 
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failed to inquire as to the amount of time that Appellant's 
counsel deemed necessary to prepare for trial, or to schedule a 
pretrial conference, as provided for by Rule 13 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure to address preparation and other relevant 
trial issues. Shortly thereafter, on January 10, 1990, Appellant 
filed with the trial court a written Motion for Continuance of the 
trial date. (R. 146-148) . Among the numerous grounds stated for a 
continuance of the trial date cited in Appellant's motion, was the 
pertinent fact that Appellant's counsel had not yet received a 
copy of the 949 pages of transcript of the preliminary hearing for 
counsel examination. In addition to the necessity of reviewing 
the voluminous preliminary hearing transcript, Appellant's 
counsel, during the short time remaining prior to trial, was faced 
with the following preparatory trial responsibilities that 
required sufficient attorney time for: (1) the need to review and 
carefully analyze the extraordinary amounts of physical, 
documentary, and expert evidence, including the statements of 
various witnesses; (2) the need to review and analyze, not only by 
counsel, but also by experts assisting counsel, documentary 
evidence generated by the State's medical examiner and forensic 
blood expert, which the prosecution had agreed to provide to 
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Appellant's counsel at the preliminary hearing, but which 
Appellant's counsel had not received as of the date of the Motion 
for Continuance on January 10, 1990. (R. 147; Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript (hereinafter ffPH", Vol, III, p. 210); (3) interview 
potential witnesses, including Pat Bentzley and Darrell Green, the 
Appellant's boss and a supervisor at Western Brine Shrimp Company, 
who each, according to the Appellant, at least, would have 
testified that Appellant was a good worker and would otherwise 
provide good character testimony; (4) the need to consult with and 
prepare the trial testimony Dr. Finkle, the court appointed 
toxicologist expert, on the effects of alcohol on an individual 
who had consumed as much alcohol as the Appellant had on the night 
of October 25, 1989; (5) the need to obtain accurate photographic 
evidence of the crime scene that would depict the lines of sight 
of the various state witnesses, and the dimness of the lighting 
from the trailer houses at night; and (6) Additionally, the need 
to consult with a psychiatric expert on the Appellant's ability to 
form the requisite intent for the charged crime of second degree 
murder. The time constraints imposed by the trial court in 
denying Appellants Motion For a Continuance of trial date 
adversely impaired the Appellant's United States Constitutional 
and Constitution of Utah guarantee to effective assistance of 
counsel and to a fair trial, at least in the following; 
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Appellant's counsel did not have sufficient time to review, in any 
depth, the preliminary hearing transcripts or the written 
statements and transcribed interviews of various key witnesses. 
As discussed below, counsel was thus unable to highlight to the 
jury, and bring out at trial, the numerous discrepancies made 
between the witnesses stories, and between each witnesses own 
statements given to the police or testified to at the preliminary 
hearing, and testified to at trial. Clearly, reversible error was 
committed as a result of the court in denying Appellants motion to 
continue the trial date to allow defense counsel to adequately 
prepare for trial; especially where the charges made were so 
graye. 
POINT IV 
DEFICIENCIES IN APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE 
RESULTED IN THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
If Appellant is able to demonstrate to this court that his 
trial counsel rendered a deficient performance in some 
demonstrable manner, and that a reasonable probability exists that 
except for ineffective counsel, the result would have been 
different, then his conviction should be reversed on the grounds 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v Geary, 707 P.2d 
645, 646 (Utah 1985). Reversal of the conviction is warranted 
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because Appellantfs trial counsel, Jack H. Molgard, failed to 
adequately investigate and prepare for trial; did not know of the 
statutority time limitations required to timely file a motion and 
notice necessary to obtain the assistance of a psychiatrist, and 
failure to adequately cross-examine the State's three eyewitnesses 
for the purpose of highlighting, for the jury, contradictions 
within their individual versions of the facts. Deficient attorney 
performance is clear from the record, which prejudiced the 
Appellant's right to a fair trial, in that defense counsel Jack H. 
Molgard failed to object to the numerous errors committed by the 
prosecution during closing argument, and to call character 
witnesses on Appellant's behalf. It is reasonably probable that 
Appellant would have been acquitted or convicted of a 
lesser-included offense, such as manslaughter or negligent 
homicide had counsel for the Appellant been adequately prepared, 
conducted adequate cross examinations, and had filed a timely 
Motion For Appointment For a Psychiatrist to evaluate the 
Appellant. Where nearly identical deficiencies in counsel's 
performance were found, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit held that the defendant was denied effective 
assistance of counsel and was prejudiced thereby in violation of 
his United States Contitution Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
United States ex rel. Washington v Maroney, 428 F.2d 10 (3rd Cir. 
1970). 
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A. Failure To Timely File the Motions For Psychiatric 
Assistance If this court finds that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion and thus commit reversible error in denying 
the Appellant the assistance of a psychiatrist to make findings 
and testify as an expert withness regarding Appellant's mental 
state, then surely Jack H. Molgard committed reversible error in 
being woefully ignorant of the time limitations set by U.C.A. 
77-14-3 "Mental Illness Defense Notice Requirement" and thus 
failing to timely file a motion for appointment of a psychiatrist. 
Defense counsel's untimely filing of the motion for appointment of 
a psychiatrist amounted to a failure to make the motions at all in 
the context of this case. In a number of cases the failure to 
maki particular motions or objections has been held to constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring reversal of a 
defendants conviction. See 9 Fed. Proc, L Ed §22:403. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that defense counsels 
ignorance of the law which results in a withdrawal of a crucial 
defense is tantamount to ineffective assistance of counsel. State 
v McNicol, 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976). The Appellant's long history 
of sustained alcohol abuse, his trial testimony regarding the 
large quantities of alcohol he consumed the night of the homicide, 
the statements of the State's own witnesses that the Appellant was 
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drunk, and Dr. Finklefs testimony regarding the effects of alcohol 
on awareness and decision making laid the framework for 
Appellant's voluntary intoxication defense. But without the 
psychiatric testimony to assist the jury in filling in the gaps 
and drawing conclusions from the evidence regarding the mental 
state of the Appellant due to the consumption of alcohol, the 
defense was effectively withdrawn from the jury due to counsel 
Molgard's ignorance of U.C.A. 77-14-3. Mental Illness defense 
notice requirement. The situation is analogous to claiming 
insanity as a defense, providing the jury with a narration of the 
events and any unusual behavior, and then failing to produce a 
psychiatrist to explain the mental workings behind the behavior. 
Confidence in this case verdict was undermined, where the proper 
framework for a crucial defense of voluntary intoxication was 
laid, through the testimony of Dr. Finkel, but the next logical 
step; essential psychiatric testimony was not presented because 
defense counsel failed to timely file a Motion For Appointment of 
Psychiatrist. 
In two similar cases from other state jurisdictions, the 
defendants convictions were reversed by the state high court upon 
the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel in that 
defendants counsel failed to present psychiatric testimony on the 
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effects of alcohol on the ability to form the requisite intent. 
Commonwealth v Beatty, 419 A.2d 711 (Pa.Super. 1980); State v 
Hester, 341 N.E.2d 304 (Ohio 1976). In Hester, the court noted: 
"although a record may contain sufficient evidence that 
counsel has been in fact incompetent (or competent), 
evidence determinative of this question is [sic] 
usually dehors the record and generally, an 
evidentiary hearing or summary judgment procedure is 
required", (at 308) 
At g. minimum, the Court should remand this case for an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue of whether or not Appellant received 
constitutionally required effective assistance of counsel. 
B. Failure To Adequately Prepare; Especially For 
Cross-Examination of Eye-Witnesses 
Defense counsel Jack H. Molgard did not adequately prepare in 
at teast the following: He failed to interview the State's 
witnesses prior to the preliminary hearing, to obtain adequate 
photographic evidence of the crime scene that depicted the lines 
of 4ight of the various witnesses, and of the dimness of the 
lighting from the trailer houses at night, to obtain background 
information on the victim regarding his character for violence and 
the State's eyewitnesses, and to review the preliminary hearing 
transcript and statements of the witnesses. Due to his lack of 
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preparation Appellant's attorney was not able to conduct a 
well-prepared, extensive and incisive cross-examinations of the 
State's three eyewitnesses. Incisive, factually penetrating 
cross-examinations was critical to the Appellant's defense in 
light of the substantial discrepancies between the accounts of the 
eyewitnesses, the Appellant, and Ray Cabututan found in the 
voluminous written statements and transcribed interviews, nine 
hundred and forty nine (949) page preliminary hearing transcript, 
and trial testimony. There were obvious eyewitness disagreements 
and discrepancies concerning the degree of the Appellant's 
involvement in the fight, the timing and nature of Appellant's 
words and actions, and the ability of the witnesses to observe and 
hear the events and properly identify persons from distances, in 
dim lighting, with lines of sight cut off by doorways, trailers, 
and amphibians, and with a loud generator operating nearby. 
Numerous testimonial discrepancies were made from the record which 
Jack H. Molgard failed to point out to the jury or draw out at 
trial, including at least: 
(1) In his written statement, in his transcribed interview, 
and at the preliminary hearing, Eddie Apadaca stated that the 
Appellant was pretty loaded or drunk. Whereas, in contravention 
at trial, he said that the Appellant had been drinking, but did 
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not seem quite drunk. (PH. Vol I, 164-65; T. 103-04). This 
discrepancy was relevant to the Appellant's intoxication defense, 
but was never pointed out to the jury. 
(2) At the preliminary hearing, Eddie Apadaca said the wind 
was pretty fierce and he could not hear from inside trailer house 
#2 what was being said outside. (PH. Vol. I, 183-84, 197). Eddie 
Apadaca1s preliminary hearing testimony was not brought out at 
trial, even though the ability of other witnesses to hear from the 
trailer houses, statements allegedly made outside by the Appellant 
was in issue and relevant to the Appellant's participation in the 
fight. 
(3) At the preliminary hearing, it came out that Eddie 
Apadaca changed his story several times as to whether the 
Appellant or Ray Cabututan said "forget him [Apadaca], let's go 
bacl^  to the other guy". (PH., Vol. I, 207-208). The alleged 
statement, by implication, bears on the Appellant's involvement in 
the fight, necessitated that the jury should have been made made 
aware of Eddie Apadaca's confusion, but were not. 
(4) At the preliminary hearing, Eddie Apadaca testified that 
he discussed with Richard Anderson the events of the night of 
Octdber 25, 1989, including what happened and what they saw, for 
about twenty minutes at Apadacafs apartment sometime prior to the 
preliminary hearing. Richard Anderson however denied discussing 
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with Eddie Apadaca what happened that night, but admitted going to 
Eddie Apadacafs apartment when confronted with Eddie ApadacaTs 
testimony, but he continued to deny having any discussion 
regarding what happened that night with Apadaca. (PH. Vol. I, 
211-12; PH. Vol. Ill, 32, 76, 81, 107; PH. Vo. IV, 673-74). This 
impeachable testimony was not brought out at trial, despite the 
fact that Px.ichard Anderson was by far the most important State eye 
witness, whose credibility was central to the State of Utahfs case 
in chief. Moreover, the testimony demonstrated that once Richard 
Anderson had testified under oath to a fact he would not change 
his testimony even when confronted with contradictory testimony or 
evidence, thus evidencing the importance of Jack H. Molgard's 
failure to interview Pvichard Anderson prior to the preliminary 
hearing. 
(5) At preliminary hearing, Eddie Apadaca testified that he 
did not remember much of what happened in trailer #2; undoubtedly, 
because of the blow to his head the night of October 25, 1989 and 
the fact that Billy Cayer was mauling him as the events occurred 
therein. Eddie Apadaca also testified that when most everybody 
was in trailer #2 Don Brown asked where the blood came from that 
was on Eddie Apadaca1s long Johns that he was wearing at the time. 
They then determined that the blood was coming from a cut on Billy 
Cayer's hand. (PH. Vol. I, 215-17). Additionally, on page 8 of 
his written statement, Apadaca stated that "shit" was flying 
everywhere in trailer #2. 
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The statements of Eddie Apadaca also were never brought out 
at trial, despite the fact that, at trial, Eddie Apadacafs account 
of events in trailer #2 did not mesh with Appellant's account that 
blows were exchanged by the Appellant and Mike Ramirez inside 
trailer #2; that the blood on Appellant's clothes derived, at 
least in part, from bleeding which occurred inside trailer #2; 
that Appellant scraped his knuckles either when he hit Mike 
Ramirez in trailer #2 or Eddie Apadaca, as he was leaving the 
camp and stated that the Appellant's sole involvement in the fight 
took place inside trailer house #2. 
(6) At preliminary hearing, Eric Tilley testified that when 
the door to trailer #1 was re-opened by Richard Anderson the fight 
had ended, Mike Ramirez was standing up by himself, and then he 
went back to his trailer, contrary to Richard Anderson's testimony 
that a good part of the fight occurred after he opened the door. 
(PH. Vol. II, 428-28, 439-40). This impeachable contradictory 
testimony was never brought out at trial, despite the grave doubt 
it placed upon the veracity of Richard Anderson regarding the 
events which occurred after the door was re-opened. 
(7) At preliminary hearing, Eric Tilley testified that Eddie 
Apadaca was chased out of camp by either Don Brown or the 
Appellant at the same time, or immediately after Sherman Gallardo 
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first opened the door to trailer house #1 (PH. Vol. II, 458, 460). 
Eric Tilley's testimony contradicted Eddie Apadacafs statement 
that Ray Cabututan started to chase him, and that the Appellant 
said, "let him [Apadaca] go. letfs go back to the other guy11. 
Because Eddie Apadaca never mentioned Don Brown being in the 
vicinity when Eddie Apadaca was chased out of camp; Eric Tilley, 
like Richard Anderson, must have heard the Appellant doing the 
chasing. Eric Tilley's testimony also contradicts Richard 
Anderson's testimony that Eddie Apadaca was run out of camp prior 
to the time the door was first opened. Eric Tilley's testimony 
supports the Appellant's testimony that he was busy chasing Eddie 
Apadaca out of camp while Mike Ramirez was being beaten outside. 
(8) At the preliminary hearing, Richard Anderson also 
testified that Don Brown was standing at the head of Mike Ramirez 
when the door to trailer #1 was first opened. Similarly, Eric 
Tilley said that the third person, who he could not identify for 
certain as being either Don Brown or the Appellant, was standing 
at the head of Mike Ramirez when the door was first opened. (PH. 
Vol. II 439, 455; PH. Vol. IV, 679). The testimony of the 
Appellant and Eric Tilly supports the position that it was Don 
Brown, and not the Appellant, who was standing around Mike Ramirez 
when the door was first opened. 
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(9) In Richard Anderson's transcribed interview in regard to 
his ability to see, he states that he could not see how people 
were dressed that night, as there was "just a little [of light] 
coming out of trailer[.]". He also states that Sherman Gallardo 
saw Eddie Apadaca being run out of camp through the open door of 
trailer house #1. (Transcribed interview of Anderson 2-3). This 
testimony further contradicts Richard Anderson's trial testimony 
that there was adequate lighting, and that Eddie Apadaca was 
chased away prior to the door being opened. Furthermore, the 
testimony supports the testimony of Eric Tilley and Appellant that 
Appellant was chasing Eddie Apadaca as the fight was ongoing when 
the door to trailer house #1 was opened. 
(10) At the preliminary hearing, Richard Anderson repeatedly 
admitted that he saw silhouettes when he opened the door, calling 
into question his ability to identify the silhouettes, especially 
giv£n the similar build and appearance of the Appellant and Don 
Brown. (PH. Vol. I 110; PH. Vol IV 687, 689). 
(11) At preliminary hearing, Richard Anderson testified that 
he Observed the fight approximately a foot and one-half inside the 
threshold of the trailer house door. (PH. Vol. Ill 56-57). This 
infprmation was relevant because Richard Anderson's ability to see 
the events occurring at angles from the door i.e., in front of 
trailer #2, may have been obstructed by the door frame. 
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Defense counsel Molgardfs egregious failure to adequately 
prepare, due in part by the trial courts failure to grant a 
continuance of the trial date, so that he was able to bring out 
these crucial facts on cross -examination and the implication of 
the discrepancies was substantial error that undermined confidence 
in the verdict, necessitating a reversal of Appellant's 
conviction. 
C. Failure To Call Character Witnesses on Appellants Behalf 
Defense counsel Jack H. Molgard also committed error, thereby 
prejudicing Appellant's trial, by failing to call the Appellant's 
supervisors to testify as to the Appellant's good character. See 
Maroney, 428 F.2d at 14-15. These witnesses would have testified 
that the Appellant was one of their best workers, and further that 
he was anything but a trouble maker. Despite Appellant's pretrial 
request to Jack H. Molgard that they be called to testify, defense 
counsel never called them as witnesses despite the obvious need 
for character testimony. 
D. Failure To Object To Numerous Prosecutorial Errors 
Finally, Appellant asserts his defense counsel was deficient 
in his performance and prejudiced the trial to such an extent that 
the verdict cannot be relied upon in producing a just result in 
that he failed to object to the numerous prosecutorial errors set 
forth above. If the prosecutorial errors to which no objection 
was raised are not found to be plain error, then the failures to 
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object should be found to constitute ineffective assistance of 
coutisel, since the errors cumulatively undermined confidence in 
the verdict. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
TO GUIDE THE JURY 
During the jury's deliberations the jury submitted the 
following three requests for further guidance from the trial 
judge: 
(1) Instruction #15 No. 1 [pertaining to the definition of 
intentionally]. The concluding words 'cause the result', does 
'result' mean death or bodily injury or what? 
(2) "Do you have to intend to kill someone to be convicted 
of second degree murder?" 
(3) "In the explanation of the act or cause of 2nd degree 
murder, if you read the paragraphs a, b, c, and d is (a) a 
statement of who the defendant is? 
Is (b) to show how much injury is found and/or how the 
person(s) inflicted the act of serious bodily injury? 
Is (c) to show that a voluntary act or acts from (b) a link 
to a conclusion? 
Is (d) a conclusion that if b + c were done then d is a 
result and/or conclusion of the above statements? 
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Is the word did in (d) a conclusion that both b and c led to 
a summary of the above para, (b) + (c)?ff (R. 298-99). 
Instead of acting decisively in an appropriate judicial 
manner to resolve the jury panels obvious confusion, the trial 
judge, on all three occasions, tersely directed them to reread the 
instructions already given. In so doing, the trial judge 
committed reversible error. See State v Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 94-95 
(Utah 1981); Price v Glosson Motor Lines, Inc., 509 F.2d 1033, 
1036-38 (4th Cir. 1975); Walsh v Miehle-Goss-Dexter, Inc., 378 
F.2d 409, 415 (3rd Cir. 1967). 
In State v Couch, the refusal of the trial court to provide a 
definition of the word "genitals" when requested to do so by the 
jury in a forcible sodomy case was found to have plainly resulted 
in a miscarriage of justice, thus constituting reversible error. 
The court reasoned: 
"Where the jury requests the instruction...it 
is generally held error to refuse to provide a 
definition, even where the word is a term of common 
meaning11. 
"Discharge of the jury's responsibility for drawing 
appropriate conclusions from the testimony depended 
on discharge of the judge's responsibility to give the 
jury the required guidance by a lucid statement 
of the relevant legal criteria. When a jury makes 
explicit its difficulties a trial~judge should 
clear them away with concrete accuracy^ (At 93-95) 
(Emphasis Added) 
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635 P.2d at 94 (quoting Bollenbach v United States, 326 U.S. 607, 
612413, 66 S. Ct. 402, 405, 90 L.Ed 350 (1946). In this case, the 
trial court erred in failing to define "result" as requested by 
the jury and clearing away the confusion with "concrete accuracy". 
The Walsh court also cited to the Bollenbach case in 
declaring that where the jury makes known its difficulty, and then 
requests further instructions on the law applicable as to an 
important issue, the trial court does not fulfill its duty to the 
jury to give supplemental instructions by the perfunctory act of 
re-reading of the very instructions which may have led to the 
difficulty. In the present case, the trial court referred the 
jury to instructions already given, not once, but on three 
occasions, in violation of its duty to provide to the jury 
concrete clarity and judicial direction on important issues 
relevent to jury duty. 
The trial court errors committed require reversal by the 
Court since they plainly resulted in a miscarriage of justice 
based upon the following: (1) the issue of intent was a central 
question, given the evidence and Appellant's defenses of voluntary 
intoxication and self-defense, and (2) all of the jury's request 
for clarification indicate that the jury was struggling with at 
least the element of intent. In fact, the subsection beginning 
with "Is (b) to show...[,]" evidences an apparent confusion with 




THE TRIAL JUDGE DENIED APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL AND DUE 
PROCESS BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO DELIBERATE FOR 8% HOURS 
UNTIL 1:20 A.M. 
After four full days of trial, the jury began deliberation at 
approximately 5:00 p.m. on the fourth day. The trial court then 
permitted the jury to deliberate for eight and one-half hours, 
after the fourth day of trial, until the early morning hour of 
1:20 a.m. (T. 675). The Appellant is entitled to a trial by jury 
which includes an independent decision by each of the jurors as to 
the defendants guilt or innocence. While the court is given wide 
discretion regarding the length of deliberation, that discretion 
is abused if the defendant is deprived of the considered judgment 
of each juror. To believe that the entire jury could remain 
engaged in the deliberation process for 8% hours after a full 
fourth day trial stretches credulity. It is unreasonable to 
believe that all the jurors could have remained alert for that 
length of time. The memory and analytical skills of the jurors 
would certainly begin to fade and the wills of any minority jurors 
would be easily overborne after that length of jury deliberations. 
The failure of the trial court to inquire whether the jury members 
were tired at a reasonable earlier hour is to give too much 
deference to those on the jury that wanted to get the job over and 
done with at the expense of the Appellant. 
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In Isom v State, 481 So.2d 820 (Miss. 1985), where the jury, 
in a manslaughter trial, deliberated from approximately 3:30 p.m. 
to 10:30 p.m. after 1% days of hearing the trial of the case, 
where several jurors expressed a desire to recess deliberations, 
and where the trial court sent the jury back for further 
deliberations, at which time the jury returned a verdict in about 
30 minutes, the time for continuous deliberation was held to be 
excessive. This court should hold as a matter of judicial 
administration, if not Constitutional law, that keeping a jury in 
deliberation continuously for 8% hours after the final day of 
trial deprives the defendant of due process of law and a fair 
trial by a jury of his peers under both the State of Utah and the 
United States Constitution. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ABSUED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING 
TO ALLOW THE JURY TO VIEW THE CRIME SCENE. 
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow a 
jur^ view of the crime scene. The trial court judge apparently 
denied Appellant's motion because of the time and distance between 
the courthouse. (1/18/90 hearing transcript at 10, 24-32); The 
I 
January 18, 1990 hearing transcript involving both Appellant's and 
Ray Cabututan's case at 5-23 (Motion for jury view of crime 
scene). (R. 236-38; Memorandum decisions denying jury view). 
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Such a view would have assisted the jury in fulfilling their 
fact finding duty by being better able to understand the 
perceptual difficulties that the eyewitnesses in the case 
encountered. The crime took place near midnight in late October 
in a rural area. The only lighting was from dim trailer house 
lights. Only one witness, Richard Anderson, stated Appellant was 
involved in the major part of the fight that occurred outside the 
trailer house. Richard Anderonsf testimony is inconsistent in 
numerous aspects with his prior statements, and preliminary 
hearing testimony and with the statements and testimony of other 
witnesses. His line of sight in all probability was also 
obstructed by door frames and vehicles. With the verdict hinging 
on such weak eyewitness testimony, it cannot be said that a 
refusal to permit a jury view of the crime scene fell within the 
trial courts sound judicial discretion. Rather, such a crime 
scene view would have contributed substantially to the 
presentation of Appellant's defense based on inadequate 
eyewitnesses identification of the Appellant. An appropriate 
ruling by this Court would be to reverse Appellant's cnoviction on 
the ground that the trial court abused its sound discretion by not 
permitting a jury view of the crime scene under Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure 17(i). The trial, and upon the unique 
circumstances of this case. 
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POINT VIII 
THE NUMEROUS SUBSTANTIAL ERRORS COMMITTED AMOUNT 
TO CUMMULATIVE ERROR 
Even assuming that none of the foregoing substantial errors, 
in and of themselves constituted reversible error, the cumulative 
impact of each error prejudiced Appellant's right to a fair trial 
thus constituting reversible error. See State v Rammel, 721 P.2d 
498, 501-02 (Utah 1986). Confidence in the verdict is undermined, 
at least to the extent that, in the absence of the cummulative 
errors, a reasonable probability exists that Appellant would have 
been convicted of one of the lesser-included offenses of 
manslaughter or negligent homicide due to his voluntary 
intoxication and lack of formation of the requisite intent to 
commit second degree murder. Under such circumstances, reversal 
is warranted. See State v Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that, at a minimum, this Court 
should remand these proceedings to the District Court for an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether or not Appellant's 
trial counsel failed to provide Appellant with effective 
assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the United States 
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Constitution Sixth Amendment and Constitution of Utah Article I 
Section 12. However, Appellant submits that the more appropriate 
remedy is for this Court to reverse his conviction and grant 
Appellant a new trial because of the numerous substantial and 
prejudicial errors which are apparent on the face of the record 
which undermine confidence in the verdict. 
Respectfully submitted this^^/ day of December, 1990. 
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